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However, as of March 2020, delays in the required federal approval processes for 
congestion pricing meant that implementation of the program by early 2021 is 
unlikely. Id. Worsening relations between New York State and the federal 
government have sparked fears that the program may be delayed indefinitely. 
Christina Goldbaum & Winnie Hu, Could the Trump Administration Block 
Congestion Pricing in New York?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/25/nyregion/-trump-congestion-pricing-nyc.html 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the first half of 2017, New York City subway riders were 
confronted with a series of increasingly outlandish instances of the 
rapid deterioration of the subway system.1  On March 2, a water main 
break flooded the Court Street station.2  On May 2, pieces of the 
ceiling fell onto a train at the Franklin Avenue stop in Crown 
Heights.3  On May 5, a major storm caused waterfalls inside several 
stations.4  On May 9, a power outage in Brooklyn led to a cascade of 
delays.5  As a result, a woman failed to make it to housing court and 
faced eviction.6  A graphic designer lost $100 in wages.7  A 
 
 1. See generally Amy Plitt & Zoe Rosenberg, MTA WTF: A Visual Timeline of 
the MTA’s Epic 2017 Meltdown, CURBED N.Y. (Jul. 17, 2017), 
https://ny.curbed.com/2017/6/14/15801694/mta-nyc-subway-delays-twitter 
[https://perma.cc/55JF-QV7V]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Emma G. Fitzsimmons, ‘Money out of Your Pocket’: New Yorkers Tell of 
Subway Delay Woes, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/31/nyregion/money-out-of-your-pocket-new-yorker
s-tell-of-subway-delay-woes.html [https://perma.cc/V4KQ-8NGR]. 
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psychoanalyst failed to make an appointment with a patient, and the 
patient failed to make it too.8 
Had they opted to drive instead, these travelers likely would not 
have fared much better.  An analysis conducted that year by the 
traffic analytics company INRIX found that New York City was the 
third most traffic-congested city in the world.9  Drivers averaged 91 
peak hours stuck in traffic and spent 13% of their time sitting in 
congestion.10  Even as a surge of investment over the subsequent two 
years has resulted in improved subway conditions,11 traffic congestion 
has remained pervasive.  Travel speeds in the section of Manhattan 
below 60th Street reached a new annual low of just over seven miles 
per hour in late 2018.12 
In a bid to address these transportation issues, New York State 
adopted legislation in 2019 that paved the way for the implementation 
of congestion pricing in New York City as soon as January 2021, 
allowing the state to toll vehicles driving into Manhattan below 60th 
Street.13  Although congestion pricing has successfully reduced traffic 
in cities around the globe, New York City is the first city in the 
United States to adopt this strategy.14  If successful, congestion 
pricing has the potential to alleviate traffic congestion in Manhattan, 
reduce harmful carbon dioxide emissions, and raise desperately 
needed revenue to fund improvements to the region’s public 
transportation infrastructure.  However, almost as soon as the 
legislature passed its congestion pricing plan into law, advocacy 
groups, business interests, and elected officials sought exemptions 
from congestion pricing fees.  While social and economic concerns 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Ameena Walker, NYC Is the Third Most Traffic Congested City in the World, 
CURBED N.Y. (Feb. 6, 2018), 
https://ny.curbed.com/2018/2/6/16979696/new-york-city-traffic-congestion-second-wor
st [https://perma.cc/JUE7-XQLR]. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Why the Subway Is No Longer a Daily Disaster., N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 13, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/13/nyregion/mta-subway-nyc.html 
[https://perma.cc/2MSU-556Q]. 
 12. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF TRANSP., NEW YORK CITY MOBILITY REPORT 18–19 (2019), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/html/dot/downloads/pdf/mobility-report-singlepage-2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VEP3-8PCF]. 
 13. Jesse McKinley & Vivian Wang, New York State Budget Deal Brings 
Congestion Pricing, Plastic Bag Ban, and Mansion Tax, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/31/nyregion/budget-new-york-congestion-pricing.ht
ml?module=inline [https://perma.cc/TV6Y-4NCG]. 
 14. Id. 
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may justify certain exemptions, each exemption granted will result in 
less traffic reduction, less emissions reduction, and less revenue 
raised.  The Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority (TBTA), 
tasked with implementing New York’s congestion pricing plan, will 
have to make difficult decisions regarding who is excluded from or 
included in the plan’s tolls. 
This Note argues that the concept of transportation equity should 
guide the TBTA in determining who receives exemptions from tolling 
under New York’s congestion pricing plan.  The TBTA should grant 
exemptions only if necessary, to preserve congestion pricing’s 
effectiveness in minimizing negative transportation-related 
externalities, such as congestion and pollution, and in supporting a 
system that provides all people with adequate access to transportation 
regardless of geography, race, or socioeconomic status.  Part I of this 
Note provides background on New York City’s transportation crisis, 
the theory of congestion pricing, the history of congestion pricing in 
other cities, — with a particular focus on London’s congestion pricing 
scheme — and New York City’s congestion pricing plan.  Part II 
examines exemptions to congestion pricing — why they are 
important, how they have impacted the effectiveness of congestion 
pricing in London, how authorities will determine who receives them 
in New York City, which groups are seeking them, and how these 
groups may try to obtain them through litigation or legislation.  Part 
III discusses the concept of transportation equity, proposes and 
applies a two-part test for determining which congestion pricing 
exemptions advance transportation equity, and suggests alternative 
strategies for preserving transportation equity under New York City’s 
congestion pricing plan. 
I. CONGESTION PRICING IN NEW YORK CITY 
Part I examines the path to congestion pricing in New York City.  
Section I.A recounts the transportation challenges in New York City 
precipitating congestion pricing’s introduction.  Section I.B provides 
background on how congestion pricing works, while Section I.C 
reviews the congestion pricing systems implemented in other cities, 
with a special focus on the system used in London.  Section I.D 
discusses the specifics of New York’s congestion pricing plan, 
including its objectives, the mechanisms for tolling vehicles, the 
system of allocating revenues, and the plan’s administration. 
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A. New York’s Transportation Crisis 
In June 2017, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo declared a 
state of emergency for the Metropolitan Transportation Authority 
(MTA), the public benefit corporation that runs the New York City 
region’s public transportation network.15  The declaration — which 
followed several high-profile equipment failures and service 
disruptions on the subway — came amid skyrocketing delays and a 
growing chorus of rider complaints.16  Since 1991, the subway’s 
on-time performance rate had decreased by 26%, even as ridership 
increased by 77%.17  With only 65% of trains reaching their 
destinations on time, on-time performance was at its lowest rate since 
the 1970s transit crisis.18  The New York City subway on-time rate is 
now the lowest of any major rapid-transit system in the world.19 
In addition to causing New Yorkers frustration,20 the increasing 
unreliability of the subway had substantial economic effects for the 
 
 15. Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Cuomo Declares a State of Emergency for New York 
City Subways, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/29/nyregion/cuomo-declares-a-state-of-emergency-f
or-the-subway.html [https://perma.cc/4A6Y-AKER] [hereinafter Fitzsimmons, 
Cuomo Declares a State of Emergency]; The MTA Network, MTA, 
https://new.mta.info/about-us/the-mta-network [https://perma.cc/7KEY-L3TY] (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2019). Cuomo’s state of emergency declaration coincided with a 
pledge of $1 billion for subway improvements and orders for the MTA Chairman to 
provide a reorganization plan for the MTA within 30 days. See Fitzsimmons, Cuomo 
Declares a State of Emergency, supra note 15. 
 16. Fitzsimmons, Cuomo Declares a State of Emergency, supra note 15. 
 17. Brian M. Rosenthal et al., How Politics and Bad Decisions Starved New 
York’s Subways, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/18/nyregion/new-york-subway-system-failure-delay
s.html [https://perma.cc/HB4H-H27H]. 
 18. In the 1970s and early 1980s, chronic underinvestment in New York City’s 
public transportation infrastructure, along with plummeting ridership, brought the 
system to the brink of collapse. Derailments, equipment failures, crime, graffiti, and 
crumbling facilities plagued the subway and on-time rates dropped below 50%. 
MARK SEAMAN ET AL., RUDIN CTR. FOR TRANSP. POLICY & MGMT., FROM RESCUE TO 
RENAISSANCE: THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE MTA CAPITAL PROGRAM 1982–2004 1–3 
(2004). For a snapshot of conditions at the outset of this crisis, see Thomas R. 
Brooks, Subway Roulette: The Game Is Getting Dangerous, N.Y. MAG., June 15, 
1970, at 41, 
https://books.google.com/books?id=_-ICAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA41&lpg=PA41&dq=
may+20,+1970+nyc+subway+crash&hl=en#v=onepage&q=may%2020%2C%201970
%20nyc%20subway%20crash&f=false [https://perma.cc/Y7K8-VP87]. 
 19. Rosenthal et al., supra note 17. 
 20. See, e.g., Subway Service Close to Normal, but Power Outage Cause 
Unknown, WABC-TV (Apr. 21, 2017), 
https://abc7ny.com/traffic/subway-service-close-to-normal-but-outage-cause-unknow
n/1899411/ [https://perma.cc/978S-58N4]; CBS N.Y., Another Day, Another Signal 
Problem on the Subway, YOUTUBE (June 14, 2017), 
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city and its residents.  A 2017 analysis by New York City Comptroller 
Scott Stringer estimated the annual cost of subway delays could be as 
high as $389 million.21  The causes of the subway’s declining 
performance were multifaceted: natural disasters, bureaucracy, and 
mismanagement all contributed to the system’s struggles,22 but the 
primary driver of the subway’s decline was underinvestment.23  
Amidst surging ridership and increasing city and state revenues, 
beginning in the early 1990s, government investment in the subways 
declined as city and state officials diverted a combined $1.5 billion 
from the MTA.24  While Governor Cuomo’s emergency declaration 
was followed by the implementation of an $800 million dollar 
short-term rescue plan for the subway,25 officials estimate a 
comprehensive plan to upgrade the subway’s outdated signal system 
would cost up to $19 billion over the first five years.26 
Above ground, New Yorkers have experienced a transportation 
crisis of a different sort — traffic congestion.  Between 2010 and 2017, 
steadily increasing population, employment, and tourism combined to 
increase travel demand in New York City.27  Motorists below 60th 
Street — an area including the city’s commercial core — have acutely 
felt the effects of this increased demand.28  Although the number of 
 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9L5MAVwB4XQ [https://perma.cc/HC57-P6CT]; 
CBS N.Y., Power Problem Cause More Subway Delays, YOUTUBE (May 9, 2017), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i7RmACOG4uM 
[https://perma.cc/A8GE-MK69]. 
 21. The Economic Cost of Subway Delays, OFF. N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER (Oct. 1, 
2017), https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/the-economic-cost-of-subway-delays/ 
[https://perma.cc/R8HQ-FAYQ]. 
 22. See generally Rosenthal, Fitzsimmons & LaForgia, supra note 17. The long 
list of factors contributing to the MTA’s poor financial state includes not just 
disasters, such as the September 11 attacks and Hurricane Sandy, but also poor 
financial decisions, such as a “debt bomb” refinancing deal Governor George Pataki 
pushed, and diversions of funds to other sources, such as when Governor Andrew 
Cuomo redirected $5 million of MTA funds to bail out upstate ski resorts struggling 
after a warm winter in 2016. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Emma G. Fitzsimmons, A Sweeping Plan to Fix the Subways Comes with a 
$19 Billion Price Tag, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/22/nyregion/nyc-subway-byford-proposal.html 
[https://perma.cc/GT5V-N29J]. 
 26. Emma G. Fitzsimmons, M.T.A. Plan to Upgrade Subways Is Ambitious. But 
Is It Even Possible?, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/11/nyregion/subway-signal-upgrade-plan.html 
[https://perma.cc/TE7V-HTS3]. 
 27. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 12, at 10–11. 
 28. Id. at 18. 
2020] KEEPING THE STREETS CLEAR 1015 
vehicles entering this portion of the city decreased from 776,000 to 
709,000 per day during this period, average automobile travel speed 
fell from 9.1 to 7.1 miles per hour.29  Two factors driving congestion 
are the skyrocketing number of trips made by for-hire vehicles30 and 
an increase in freight traffic and home deliveries.31  Like delays in the 
subway system, traffic congestion imposes a quantifiable economic 
cost on New Yorkers.  A 2018 analysis by the business advocacy 
group Partnership for New York City estimated that traffic 
congestion costs the New York City region about $20 billion 
annually,32 meaning that, for the average commuter entering 
Manhattan, the cost is $1892 per year.33  Facing the dual crises of 
declining subway performance and increasing traffic congestion, 
Governor Cuomo voiced support for a solution that advocates 
believed could help solve both problems — a congestion pricing plan 
requiring drivers to pay a fee to enter lower Manhattan.34 
B. Basics of Congestion Pricing 
Congestion pricing is a pricing strategy that aims to regulate 
demand by increasing costs without increasing supply.35  Congestion 
 
 29. Id. at 12–13. 
 30. The number of citywide for-hire vehicle trips increased from approximately 
168.9 million in 2010 to 315.9 million in 2017. Id. The number of taxi and for-hire 
vehicle registrations increased from approximately 41,200 in 2010 to 100,700 in 2017. 
Id. 
 31. The annual number of MTA Bridge & Tunnel and Port Authority of New 
York and New Jersey freight trips increased from approximately 32.9 million in 2010 
to 34.6 million in 2017. Id. Almost 45% of New Yorkers receive a home delivery at 
least once per week. Amy Plitt & Valeria Ricciulli, New York City’s Streets Are 
‘More Congested Than Ever’: Report, CURBED N.Y. (Aug. 15, 2019), 
https://ny.curbed.com/2019/8/15/20807470/nyc-streets-dot-mobility-report-congestion 
[https://perma.cc/GKK7-3QL6]. 
 32. $100 Billion Cost of Traffic Congestion in Metro New York, PARTNERSHIP 
FOR N.Y.C. (2018), 
https://pfnyc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/2018-01-Congestion-Pricing.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/63D5-A6YE]. Of this figure, $9.17 billion is attributable to 
increased travel time cost, $5.85 billion to revenue loss by industry, $2.54 billion to 
excess fuel and vehicle operating costs, and $2.42 billion to increases in operating 
costs by industry. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Marc Santora, Cuomo Calls Manhattan Traffic Plan an Idea ‘Whose Time Has 
Come’, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/13/nyregion/cuomo-rethinks-opposition-to-tolls-to-
ease-manhattan-traffic.html?module=inline [https://perma.cc/4ZHN-ADU3]. 
 35. Carla Tardi, Congestion Pricing, INVESTOPEDIA (Jul. 9, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/congestion-pricing.asp 
[https://perma.cc/7QGD-NBER]. 
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pricing is used by certain sectors — like the hotel and utility industries 
— where demand varies depending on physical location, time of day, 
or time of year.36  For example, hotel rooms may be more expensive 
during major holiday travel periods and electricity rates may be 
higher during the summer because of increased air conditioner 
usage.37  Congestion pricing forces individuals to account for the costs 
of using a resource in a time or place where the resource is in high 
demand by charging those individuals extra fees.38 
In the context of automobile traffic, congestion pricing incentivizes 
drivers to shift discretionary automobile travel to other modes of 
transportation or to off-peak periods by imposing a cost for driving in 
high-traffic areas or during high-traffic periods.39  While allowing 
governments to raise revenue that can be redirected towards mass 
transit or other projects, congestion pricing also benefits the public by 
reducing automobile travel times, fuel consumption, and emissions.40  
Several traffic pricing strategies are included under the umbrella of 
congestion pricing — including variably priced express lanes, roadway 
tolls, and area-wide per-mile driving charges — but proposals for New 
York involve a cordon pricing strategy where drivers are charged a 
flat fee for entering a specific area, that is, below 60th Street in 
Manhattan.41  Initial studies of potential congestion pricing plans in 
New York City indicated congestion pricing could raise over $1 
billion annually for improving public transportation in the region.42  
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., CONGESTION PRICING: A 
PRIMER 1 (2006) [hereinafter FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., PRIMER], 
https://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/congestionpricing/congestionpricing.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P6ZS-4KX5] . 
 40. Id. at 5. 
 41. Id. at 1; see N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1704-A (McKinney 2019). 
 42. See, e.g., Justin Davidson, Why You Should Be in Favor of Congestion 
Pricing in New York, N.Y. MAG. (Mar. 27, 2018), 
http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/03/all-the-arguments-against-congestion-pricing-
refuted.html [https://perma.cc/6XUW-63XH]; Benjamin Kabak, Amid Political 
Bickering, a Progressive Solution to NYC’s Transit Crisis Waits in the Wings, 
CURBED N.Y. (Aug. 1, 2018), 
https://ny.curbed.com/2018/8/1/17631480/nyc-subway-transit-crisis-congestion-pricing-
progressive [https://perma.cc/4UTV-TLJD]; Charles Komanoff, The Fix NYC 
Congestion Pricing Plan Looks Solid — If Cuomo Aims High, STREETSBLOG NYC 
(Jan. 23, 2018), 
https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2018/01/23/the-fix-nyc-congestion-pricing-plan-looks-solid-
if-cuomo-aims-high/ [https://perma.cc/9G4R-YSC7] [hereinafter Komanoff, The Fix 
NYC]. 
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By discouraging drivers from entering Manhattan via automobiles, 
congestion pricing could also help increase traffic speeds by as much 
as 10%.43 
C. Congestion Pricing outside the United States 
The effective implementation of congestion pricing in cities outside 
the United States has bolstered arguments in favor of congestion 
pricing in New York City.44  In 1975, Singapore began charging 
drivers to enter a two square mile “restricted zone” in its central 
business district during morning peak hours.45  This charge on 
Singaporean drivers resulted in a 76% reduction in private car usage 
within the central business district and a doubling of bus usage.46  The 
Italian city of Milan,47 the Swedish cities of Gothenburg and 
Stockholm,48 and other European cities such as Durham, England 
and Znojmo, Czech Republic49 have also introduced cordon-style 
congestion pricing schemes.  These congestion pricing 
 
 43. Komanoff, The Fix NYC, supra note 42. 
 44. Jesse McKinley & Winnie Hu, Congestion Pricing in Manhattan, First Such 
Plan in U.S., Is Close to Approval, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/25/nyregion/congestion-pricing-nyc.html?module=i
nline [https://perma.cc/2FAK-WXYY]. 
 45. KIRAN BHATT ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., LESSONS LEARNED FROM 
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE IN CONGESTION PRICING 2-1 (2008), 
https://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/fhwahop08047/Intl_CPLessons.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8VX5-K666]; Christian Iaione, The Tragedy of Urban Roads: 
Saving Cities from Choking, Calling on Citizens to Combat Climate Change, 37 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 889, 917 (2010). For comparison, New York City’s central 
business district has an area of approximately nine square miles. Press Release, 
Metro. Transp. Auth., MTA Announces Selection of TransCore to Build 
Nation-Leading Central Business District Tolling System (Oct. 18, 2019), 
http://www.mta.info/press-release/bridges-tunnels/mta-announces-selection-transcore
-build-nation-leading-central [https://perma.cc/N4PV-WDU7]. 
 46. Iaione, supra note 45, at 918. As Singapore has expanded its congestion 
pricing system over the years, results have remained strong. While the sizable 
immediate effects have diminished somewhat, congestion remained 31% below 
pre-plan levels as of 2010, despite a 77% increase in the number of cars in the city. Id. 
 47. Id. at 922. The primary stated goals of Milan’s plan, which began in 2008, were 
to reduce emissions and improve air quality. Id. 
 48. Congestion Taxes in Stockholm and Gothenburg, TRANSPORT STYRELSEN 
(Oct. 2, 2017), 
https://transportstyrelsen.se/en/road/Congestion-taxes-in-Stockholm-and-Goteborg/ 
[https://perma.cc/G42L-2RKR]. 
 49. See NICOLE DUPUIS ET AL., NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, MAKING SPACE: 
CONGESTION PRICING IN CITIES 17 (2019), 
https://www.nlc.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/CSAR_ConjestionPricingReport_Final
_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/RD54-3PJX]. 
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implementations demonstrate the success of cordon-style congestion 
pricing schemes across a range of urban areas. 
The largest city to implement congestion pricing50 — and the city 
most similar to New York in terms of population size and economic 
and cultural diversity51 — is London.  Like New York, London has a 
robust and complex transportation network that includes subways, 
commuter rail, ferries, and an extensive bus system.52  London has 
also suffered from severe traffic congestion.53  Before the 
introduction of congestion pricing in 2003, London had an average 
automobile speed of only 7.5 miles per hour in the city center and was 
losing between $3 to $6 million a week as a consequence of gridlock.54  
Broad public acknowledgment of the traffic congestion problem and 
Mayor Ken Livingstone’s strong commitment to congestion pricing 
hastened congestion pricing’s passage into law.55 
London’s congestion pricing system — administered by the city’s 
transit agency, Transport for London (TfL) — charges drivers a flat 
daily fee to enter a 16 square mile area in the city center between 7:00 
a.m. and 6:00 p.m Monday through Friday.56  The system utilizes an 
extensive camera network to charge zone entrants using automatic 
license plate recognition.57  The charge for entering the zone was £5 
($6.41 USD)58 in 2003 and has been raised several times, reaching the 
current rate of £11.50 ($14.74 USD) in 2014.59  The goals of London’s 
 
 50. EMILY PROVONSHA & NICKOLAS SIFUENTES, TRI-STATE TRANSP. CAMPAIGN, 
ROAD PRICING IN LONDON, STOCKHOLM AND SINGAPORE: A WAY FORWARD FOR 
NEW YORK CITY 4 (2018), 
https://nyc.streetsblog.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/TSTC_A_Way_Forward_CPr
eport_1.4.18_medium.pdf [https://perma.cc/GND3-FA78]. 
 51. DUPUIS ET AL., supra note 49, at 6. 
 52. PROVONSHA & SIFUENTES, supra note 50, at 6. 
 53. DUPUIS ET AL., supra note 49, at 6. 
 54. Id. 
 55. PROVONSHA & SIFUENTES, supra note 50, at 7. At the time of the scheme’s 
implementation, 90% of London residents believed there was too much traffic and 
expressed concerns about travel time and air pollution. Id. 
 56. Id.; BHATT, HIGGINS & BERG, supra note 45, at 2-12. 
 57. PROVONSHA & SIFUENTES, supra note 50, at 7. Cameras mounted at all zone 
entry points photograph the license plates of entering vehicles. Drivers can pay by 
telephone, text message, online, or mail. If authorities do not receive payment by 
midnight on the day after travel, drivers receive a fine of £130 ($166.66 USD). Id. 
 58. This currency conversion, and all subsequent currency conversions in this 
Note, were conducted on February 29, 2020, using the Google Finance currency 
conversion tool. For more information, see Finance Data Listing and Disclaimers, 
GOOGLE FIN., https://www.google.com/googlefinance/disclaimer/ 
[https://perma.cc/9PPG-WHXG] (last visited Feb. 29, 2020). 
 59. PROVONSHA & SIFUENTES, supra note 50, at 8. 
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congestion pricing system include reducing automobile congestion, 
improving bus service, improving journey-time reliability for car trips, 
and improving the efficiency of the distribution of goods and 
services.60  The scheme required a $214 million initial investment and 
has annual operating costs of roughly $172 million.61  Annual net 
revenue is  roughly $182 million.62 
London’s system has provided an array of benefits to the city.  
Approximately $1.8 billion in net revenue was invested in public 
transportation, road and bridge improvement, walking, and cycling 
projects between 2003 and 2013.63  By 2004, traffic congestion had 
decreased by 30%, and automobile speeds in the congestion zone had 
increased by 30%.64  Public transportation usage surged, with bus 
ridership reaching a 50-year high in 2011.65  Pollution decreased,66 
lowering the risk of health issues such as asthma, bronchitis, and heart 
attacks for city residents.67  One study estimated that more than 1888 
extra years of life had been saved for London’s residents as a result of 
cleaner air.68 
However, implementation of congestion pricing has not solved all 
the transportation problems in London.  Traffic congestion has once 
again begun to tick upwards in recent years69 — a trend attributed 
both to increases in the amount of road capacity devoted to buses, 
cyclists, and pedestrians,70 as well as to an increase in the number of 
for-hire vehicles.71  Furthermore, revenues from congestion pricing 
made up only 8.5% of revenues for TfL between 2014 and 2015.72  In 
April 2019, London introduced a separate congestion fee to combat 
 
 60. Id. at 7. 
 61. Id. at 8. 
 62. Id. The annual operating cost of London’s system takes up almost half of the 
system’s gross revenue. Id. In Stockholm (7%) and Singapore (16%), the proportion 
of gross revenue used on operating costs is significantly lower. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. From 2002–2003, carbon dioxide emissions declined by 16%, nitrogen oxide 
emissions by 13.5%, and particulate matter by 15.5%. Id. at 9. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Nicole Badstuber, London’s Congestion Charge Is Showing Its Age, CITYLAB 
(Apr. 11, 2018), 
https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2018/04/londons-congestion-charge-needs-up
dating/557699/ [https://perma.cc/8NJY-PGSQ]. 
 72. DUPUIS ET AL., supra note 49, at 7. 
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the still-persistent air pollution problem.73  Even with these 
challenges, London provides a case study for how a congestion pricing 
plan can help solve a variety of transportation, health, and 
infrastructure challenges in the urban core of a large city like New 
York. 
D. New York’s Central Business District Tolling Program 
Despite the success of congestion pricing in London and other 
cities around the world, early efforts to implement congestion pricing 
in New York City were met with resistance from business, labor, and 
political interests.74  The New York congestion pricing plan passed 
into law in 2019 follows a decades-long history of attempts to regulate 
traffic in the city through pricing.75  Previous congestion pricing plans 
for New York City had been defeated in court,76 been fatally limited 
in scope,77 withered in the face of political backlash,78 or failed to gain 
 
 73. Ultra Low Emission Zone (ULEZ), CITY OF LONDON, 
https://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/business/environmental-health/environmental-prote
ction/air-quality/Pages/ultra-low-emission-zone.aspx [https://perma.cc/RP7Z-27BF] 
(last visited Apr. 2, 2020). The new £12.50 ($16.03 USD) fee will be applied daily to 
vehicles entering the city center that fall short of established emissions standards. Id. 
Unlike the existing congestion pricing charge, this new fee will be charged 24/7. Id. A 
driver entering the congestion zone during a weekday may be charged both fees, for a 
total of £24 ($30.77 USD). Id. Authorities plan to extend the new fee to cover an 
even greater area beginning in 2021. Id. 
 74. Groups that opposed previous congestion pricing plans include the taxi, 
trucking, tourism, hotel, entertainment, hospital, and parking garage industries, as 
well as the labor union the Teamsters. Aaron Naparstek, Congestion Charging in 
New York City: The Political Bloodbath, STREETSBLOG NYC (Dec. 4, 2006), 
https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2006/12/04/congestion-charging-in-new-york-city-the-politi
cal-bloodbath/ [https://perma.cc/KF9K-LVJ8] (chronicling the decades-long history 
of opposition to attempts to toll drivers entering Manhattan); see also Nicholas 
Confessore, $8 Traffic Fee for Manhattan Gets Nowhere, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2008), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/08/nyregion/08congest.html 
[https://perma.cc/BCJ2-FMZM] (regarding the collapse of New York City Mayor 
Michael R. Bloomberg’s 2008 congestion pricing proposal amidst strong opposition 
from state legislators representing Brooklyn, Queens, and New York City suburbs). 
 75. Iaione, supra note 45, at 919. 
 76.  Auto. Club of N.Y., Inc. v. City of New York, 1981 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3518 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981). This was the fate of two separate plans proposed by Mayor Ed 
Koch in the 1980s. Iaione, supra note 45, at 919. 
 77. A 2000 congestion pricing scheme for several city bridges and tunnels had 
minimal impact on traffic congestion. Observers have suggested the poor results were 
due to the marginal nature of the toll increases during peak periods and the lack of 
alternatives to using the tolled facilities. See Iaione, supra note 45, at 919. 
 78. This was the fate of a 2005 cordon pricing proposal from Mayor Bloomberg’s 
Administration. Id. at 920. 
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necessary support in the New York State Legislature.79  As late as 
December 2017, New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio continued to 
oppose congestion pricing, asserting that the strategy was regressive 
and would unfairly burden low-income New Yorkers and 
outer-borough residents.80  Mayor de Blasio — along with a majority 
of the New York City Council — advocated raising funds for subway 
improvements through a “millionaire’s tax” on individuals earning 
more than $500,000 annually.81 
Finally, in March 2019, the New York State Legislature authorized 
a cordon-style congestion pricing plan for lower Manhattan as part of 
the state budget.82  Support from Governor Cuomo and a change in 
position from Mayor de Blasio — who came to agree the strategy was 
essential for funding New York City’s subway system — helped 
ensure the plan’s passage.83  New York’s plan has three major goals: 
reducing the volume of Manhattan traffic, reducing air pollution, and 
securing funding for the region’s public transit system.84  In passing 
the plan, the state legislature specifically declared a “long-term and 
 
 79. A non-vote in the state assembly defeated a second Bloomberg 
Administration cordon pricing plan. Strong opposition from some state lawmakers 
contributed to this defeat, despite an extensive review by a joint panel of city and 
state experts and the availability of hundreds of millions of dollars in federal funding. 
Id. at 921. 
 80. Brad Aaron, De Blasio’s Wrong: There’s a Fair Congestion Pricing Plan Right 
under His Nose, STREETSBLOG NYC (Dec. 1, 2017), 
https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2017/12/01/de-blasios-wrong-theres-a-fair-congestion-prici
ng-plan-right-under-his-nose/ [https://perma.cc/37JU-HSRA]. Studies by the 
advocacy group Community Service Society contradicted Mayor de Blasio’s claim 
that congestion pricing would function as a regressive tax that would 
disproportionately burden outer-borough residents. Id. 
 81. Zoe Rosenberg, De Blasio’s Proposed Millionaire’s Tax Backed by More 
Than Half of City Council, CURBED N.Y. (Oct. 26, 2017), 
https://ny.curbed.com/2017/10/26/16552712/millionaires-tax-bill-de-blasio-fair-fix 
[https://perma.cc/JB98-ETLS]. While a millionaire’s tax would serve as a progressive 
means of raising revenue, it would fail to address the negative externalities resulting 
from traffic congestion including noise pollution, air pollution, and increased travel 
times. 
 82. McKinley & Wang, supra note 13. 
 83. David Meyer, Breaking: Mayor de Blasio Endorses Congestion Pricing as Part 
of Cuomo MTA Takeover, STREETSBLOG NYC (Feb. 26, 2019), 
https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2019/02/26/breaking-mayor-de-blasio-endorses-congestion-
pricing-as-part-of-cuomo-mta-takeover/ [https://perma.cc/NSH8-GJYD]. 
 84. Michael B. Gerrard & Edward McTiernan, New York’s New Congestion 
Pricing Law, N.Y.L.J. (May 8, 2019), 
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/05/08/new-yorks-new-congestion-prici
ng-law/ [https://perma.cc/35EY-KJS2]. 
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sustainable solution” was necessary “to ensure stable and reliable 
funding to repair and revitalize” New York City’s subway system.85 
The 2019 New York State budget establishes a “central business 
district tolling program” (CBDTP) to be administered by the 
TBTA.86  The central business district (CBD) is defined as the area in 
Manhattan from 60th Street southward, excluding the FDR Drive and 
the West Side Highway.87  This nine square mile area is the largest 
employment center in the region, housing 2 million jobs, 450 million 
square feet of office space, and 600,000 residents.88  Approximately 
880,000 people drive into the CBD every day.89  Under the CBDTP, 
the TBTA has the power to establish and collect tolls and fees from 
vehicles entering or remaining in the CBD at any time.90  Passenger 
vehicles may only be charged once per day.91  In addition to laying 
out the basic parameters of this plan, the state legislature also made 
plans to establish a permanent infrastructure to manage and 
administer the new CBDTP. 
Under the new congestion pricing plan, the TBTA must ensure 
that annual revenues from the CBDTP, minus costs, are sufficient to 
provide at least $15 billion for capital projects in the 2020–2024 MTA 
Capital Program.92  Subject to agreements with bondholders and 
federal law, remaining revenues from the CBDTP after covering the 
program’s operating costs must go towards MTA capital 
expenditures, with 80% designated for the New York City Transit 
Authority (which runs the city’s subway and bus systems), 10% 
designated for the Long Island Rail Road (LIRR), and 10% 
designated for the Metro North Commuter Railroad.93  Infrastructure 
for the tolling system is to be planned, designed, installed, and 
operated by the TBTA in coordination with the New York City 
 
 85. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1701 (McKinney 2019). 
 86. Id. § 1704 (McKinney 2019). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Press Release, Metro. Transp. Auth., supra note 45. 
 89. Emma G. Fitzsimmons, New York Is Adopting Congestion Pricing. New 
Jersey Wants Revenge., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/16/nyregion/congestion-pricing-new-jersey.html 
[https://perma.cc/5UWE-GKAG] [hereinafter Fitzsimmons, New York Is Adopting 
Congestion Pricing]. 
 90. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1704-A (McKinney 2019). 
 91. Id. Notably, this leaves the door open for the TBTA to charge trucks and 
other non-passenger vehicles more than once per day. 
 92. Id. 
 93. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 553-j (McKinney 2019). 
2020] KEEPING THE STREETS CLEAR 1023 
Department of Transportation.94  The state budget requires the 
TBTA establish a six-person Traffic Mobility Review Board (TMRB) 
to conduct studies related to the CBDTP and determine toll 
amounts.95  The Mayor of New York City is to recommend one of the 
TMRB’s members, and one member shall come from each of the 
LIRR and Metro North service areas.96  With this basic framework 
and administration outlined by the state legislature, the TBTA and 
TMRB now must consider a critical element of this new plan: 
exemptions. 
II. THE PROVISION OF EXEMPTIONS UNDER NEW YORK'S CENTRAL 
BUSINESS DISTRICT TOLLING PROGRAM 
Part II discusses the factors influencing provision of exemptions 
under the CBDTP.  Section II.A explains why limiting exemptions is 
essential for preserving the effectiveness of the CBDTP in achieving 
its stated goals.  Section II.B examines the present exemptions under 
London’s congestion pricing plan and considers what lessons New 
York can learn from the London model.  Section II.C lays out the 
procedures the TBTA will use to determine exemptions under the 
CBDTP.  Section II.D surveys the numerous groups seeking 
exemptions under the CBDTP and examines their arguments.  Lastly, 
Section II.E speculates how these groups may seek to obtain 
exemptions through litigation or legislation. 
A. The Importance of Limiting Exemptions in a Congestion Pricing 
System 
Effectively implementing congestion pricing in New York will 
highly depend on tolling, exemptions, and other design aspects of the 
CBDTP.97  Pressure to provide exemptions is likely to be high, 
especially considering the lukewarm initial public response to the 
CBDTP.  A Quinnipiac poll from April 2019 found that 54% of New 
Yorkers oppose the plan, and 52% have expressed skepticism about 
the plan’s effectiveness in reducing traffic.98  Because the CBDTP’s 
 
 94. Gerrard & McTiernan, supra note 84. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. DUPUIS ET AL., supra note 49, at 13. 
 98. Congestion Pricing Won’t Work, New Yorkers Say, Quinnipiac University 
Poll Finds; Voters Say Scrap Elite School Test, Increase Diversity, QUINNIPIAC U. 
POLL (Apr. 2, 2019), 
https://poll.qu.edu/new-york-city/release-detail?ReleaseID=2612 
[https://perma.cc/Q7PQ-UH8X]. This mirrors initial public opinion towards 
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authorizing legislation requires the program to raise a set amount of 
revenue, provision of exemptions will necessarily result in higher 
tolls.99  Even without an established revenue threshold, experts warn 
excessive exemptions would damage the congestion and emissions 
benefits of the CBDTP.100 
Transportation experts and advocates have been vocal about 
limiting the number of exemptions.  Transportation engineer and 
former New York City Traffic Commissioner Sam Schwartz,101 one of 
the New York congestion pricing plan’s authors, argues there should 
be “just about no exemptions” because “[p]eople using their cars 
contribute to congestion. It doesn’t matter what group they belong 
to.”102  Transit economist Charles Komanoff notes congestion pricing 
rests upon the principle that all vehicles contributing to congestion 
should pay a price to mitigate its effects.103  By undermining this 
principle, Komanoff worries excessive exemptions would breed public 
resentment of congestion pricing and erode compliance.104  Using a 
sample congestion pricing plan that Governor Cuomo’s Fix NYC 
Advisory Panel proposed,105 Komanoff conducted an analysis of how 
exemptions for 10% of rides would affect the impacts of congestion 
 
congestion pricing in other cities that have implemented congestion pricing. In many 
cases, public opinion shifted favorably once governments implemented their plans 
and the benefits of the plans were realized. DUPUIS ET AL., supra note 49, at 15. 
 99. Traffic expert Sam Schwartz, one of the architects of New York’s congestion 
pricing plan, notes that too many exemptions could push tolls to over $15. Emma G. 
Fitzsimmons & Winnie Hu, Congestion Pricing Is Coming. Now Everyone Wants a 
Break., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/04/nyregion/congestion-pricing-trucks-new-jersey.h
tml?module=inline [https://perma.cc/YTP6-3NZT]. 
 100. Charles Komanoff, Komanoff: Congestion Pricing Carveouts Will Steal 
Millions of Hours and Billions of Bucks, STREETSBLOG NYC (Mar. 28, 2019), 
https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2019/03/28/komanoff-congestion-pricing-carveouts-will-ste
al-millions-of-hours-and-billions-of-bucks/ [https://perma.cc/LQ4R-QLJ5] 
[hereinafter Komanoff, Congestion Pricing Carveouts]. 
 101. Samuel I. Schwartz, PE, SAM SCHWARTZ, 
https://www.samschwartz.com/leadership-samuel-i-schwartz 
[https://perma.cc/6593-Y7EX] (last visited Apr. 2, 2020). 
 102. Fitzsimmons & Hu, supra note 99. 
 103. Komanoff, Congestion Pricing Carveouts, supra note 100. 
 104. Id. Administration of exemptions would also impose additional bureaucratic 
costs. Id. 
 105. The Governor convened this panel, comprised of elected officials, business 
and labor leaders, and transportation experts and advocates, in October 2017 to 
advise the state on proposals for funding mass transit improvements and reducing 
traffic congestion. Governor Cuomo Announces “Fix NYC” Advisory Panel, N.Y. 
STATE (Oct. 5, 2017), 
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-announces-fix-nyc-advisory-pane
l [https://perma.cc/SFZ2-A9MR]. 
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pricing.106  He found net annual revenues for investment into the 
transit system would shrink by $100 million,107 travel time savings for 
drivers would shrink by 7%, and 44,000 hours a day of combined time 
savings and $300 million per year in net benefits from congestion 
pricing would be lost.108  Komanoff’s analysis indicates how excessive 
exemptions under the CBDTP could curtail the program’s 
effectiveness at raising revenue for public transportation and 
combating negative externalities stemming from congestion. 
B. Discounts and Exemptions under London’s Congestion Pricing 
Scheme 
The congestion pricing system in London can provide lessons for 
New York regarding how to manage exemptions to congestion 
pricing.  London’s congestion pricing system provides discounts and 
exemptions for a variety of vehicles.109  Registered residents of the 
congestion zone in London receive a 90% discount on the congestion 
charge.110  Full exemptions from the charge are provided for 
emergency service vehicles, National Health Service vehicles, vehicles 
used by people with disabilities, vehicles with nine or more seats, 
two-wheeled motorbikes and motor tricycles, tow trucks and roadside 
recovery vehicles, and vehicles used by certain government agencies 
including the armed forces and the Royal Parks Agency.111  These 
exemptions existed from the beginning of the London congestion 
pricing scheme, and TfL has supplemented these exemptions with 
other specialized exemptions. 
TfL has further implemented two large exemptions over the course 
of the scheme’s history.  The first exemption is the “Greener Vehicle 
 
 106. Komanoff, Congestion Pricing Carveouts, supra note 100. 
 107. Id. The cost of outfitting a subway line with modern signals is approximately 
$1.2 billion. Id. 
 108. Id. A report issued by the Regional Plan Association (RPA), a civic 
organization focused on regional planning in the New York metropolitan area, 
echoes Schwartz’s and Komanoff’s warnings about exemptions. According to the 
RPA, “[a]ny discounts or exemptions granted to particular classes of users will erode 
the revenue and congestion mitigation impacts of the program, and increase the 
burden on non-exempt users.” CHRISTOPHER JONES ET AL., REG’L PLAN ASS’N, 
CONGESTION PRICING IN NYC: GETTING IT RIGHT 17 (2019), 
http://library.rpa.org/pdf/RPA-CongestionPricingNYC_GettingItRight.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9BQZ-DQU3]. 
 109. Discounts and Exemptions, TRANSPORT FOR LONDON, 
https://tfl.gov.uk/modes/driving/congestion-charge/discounts-and-exemptions 
[https://perma.cc/6U2G-J8Y3] (last visited Jan. 15, 2020). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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Discount” that originally exempted vehicles emitting less than 
100g/km of carbon dioxide from the congestion pricing fee.112  In 
2013, this discount was replaced with the “Ultra Low Emission 
Discount,” which imposed even stricter fuel efficiency standards.113  
By 2021, only zero-emission vehicles will be exempt from congestion 
pricing fees, and TfL will eliminate the discount entirely at the end of 
2025.114  In April 2019, London introduced a new, 24/7 Ultra Low 
Emission Zone coterminous with the congestion pricing zone.115  
Vehicles entering this zone that do not meet fuel efficiency standards 
are now charged a separate fee that is, if necessary, added onto the 
weekday congestion pricing fee.116 
Another shifting exemption under London’s congestion pricing 
scheme involves taxis and for-hire vehicles.  Initially, all for-hire 
vehicles were exempt from London’s congestion charges.117  
However, as ride sharing services, such as Uber, grew in popularity 
inside the congestion zone, these vehicles began to affect the 
congestion pricing scheme’s effectiveness, contributing to longer 
travel times and increased congestion.118  In 2019, the exemption for 
private for-hire taxi operators was eliminated, although London’s 
famous black cabs retained their exemption.119  The histories of 
London’s low emissions vehicle and for-hire vehicle exemptions 
demonstrate the need for congestion pricing plans to be flexible in 
adapting to changing conditions and technology, and to take a hard 
 
 112. Jessica Shankleman, London Tightens up Congestion Charge in Attempt to 
Drive out Diesel, GUARDIAN (Apr. 24, 2013), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/apr/24/pollution 
[https://perma.cc/6GKQ-3TLV]. 
 113. Id. 
 114. DUPUIS ET AL., supra note 49, at 7. 
 115. Ultra Low Emission Zone (ULEZ), supra note 73. 
 116. Id. 
 117. DUPUIS ET AL., supra note 49, at 7. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Costas Pitas, Uber and Other Taxi Firms to Pay London Congestion Charge, 
REUTERS (Dec. 19, 2018), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-taxi/uber-and-other-taxi-firms-to-pay-lond
on-congestion-charge-idUSKBN1OI14H [https://perma.cc/7D2L-TYKB]. Black cabs 
are also exempt from paying to enter the new ultra-low emission zone. Gwyn 
Topham, London Prepares for Launch of Ultra-Low Emissions Zone, GUARDIAN 
(Apr. 6, 2019), 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/apr/06/london-prepares-for-launch-of-ult
ra-low-emissions-zone [https://perma.cc/EJL3-3GX2]. 
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stance against exemptions that threaten a congestion pricing plan’s 
effectiveness.120 
C. Approved Exemptions under New York’s Central Business 
District Tolling Program 
The New York City CBDTP’s authorizing legislation mandates two 
broad classes of exemption.  First, emergency vehicles and vehicles 
carrying persons with disabilities will not be tolled under the 
CBDTP.121  A statement by Governor Cuomo and Mayor de Blasio 
suggests this exemption is intended to extend to “individuals who 
have an identifiable hardship or limited ability to access medical 
facilities in the CBD.”122  Second, CBD residents with annual incomes 
less than $60,000 will receive a tax credit offsetting their amount paid 
under the CBDTP.123  The TBTA is authorized to provide additional 
credits, discounts, and exemptions under the CBDTP upon the 
TMRB’s recommendation or on the basis of a traffic study that 
considers impact.124  The TBTA is also specifically tasked with 
implementing a plan addressing credits, discounts, and exemptions for 
for-hire vehicles, informed by the TMRB’s recommendations.125 
 
 120. DUPUIS ET AL., supra note 49, at 7; Bobby Cuza, London’s Experience with 
Congestion Pricing: It’s Working!, STREETSBLOG NYC (May 31, 2019), 
https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2019/05/31/london-on-congestion-pricing-its-awesome/ 
[https://perma.cc/AR62-JQ4X]. 
 121. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1704-A (McKinney 2019). 
 122. Press Release, N.Y.C. Office of the Mayor, Mayor de Blasio and Governor 
Cuomo Announce 10 Point Plan to Transform and Fund the MTA (Feb. 26, 2019), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/111-19/mayor-de-blasio-governor-cuo
mo-10-point-plan-transform-fund-mta?fbclid=IwAR0y1WP-HtEQNMnMOkQR6kf7
ZTmKIr3DoSLmgWMjuA9H8yOhumgZIlV-5Bw [https://perma.cc/FLC8-AAZS]. 
 123. JONES ET AL., supra note 108, at 4. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. These vehicles — taxis, green cabs, limousines, black cars, livery vehicles, 
rideshare vehicles, and pool vehicles — are already subject to a separate congestion 
surcharge. Congestion Surcharge, N.Y. ST. DEP’T TAX’N & FIN. (Sept. 30, 2019), 
https://www.tax.ny.gov/bus/cs/csidx.htm [https://perma.cc/8UUJ-QGUT]. This 
surcharge, which went into effect on February 2, 2019, imposes an additional cost 
($2.50 for medallion taxicabs, $2.75 for other for-hire transportation trips, and $0.75 
for pool rides) on all for-hire trips beginning in, ending in, or passing through 
Manhattan below 96th Street. Id. The New York State Legislature passed the fee — a 
precursor to the more extensive CBDTP — in 2018, but it was delayed by an 
unsuccessful lawsuit from the taxi industry. Like the CBDTP, the state legislature 
intended the fee to raise money for the subway system. Winnie Hu, Your Taxi or 
Uber Ride in Manhattan Will Soon Cost More, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/31/nyregion/uber-taxi-lyft-fee.html 
[https://perma.cc/W687-4TRJ]. 
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D. Groups Seeking Exemptions 
Numerous interest groups are seeking, or are expected to seek, 
exemptions under the CBDTP.  These include labor groups 
concerned that new congestion fees will disproportionately impact 
their workers and jeopardize their livelihoods, industry groups 
worried about the effects of new expenses on their bottom lines, 
motorcycle and low-emissions vehicle owners who believe they are 
inappropriate targets for a program intended to address congestion 
and emissions, and politicians fighting to protect their constituents 
from a new government-imposed cost.126  Because New York State 
lawmakers intentionally left language regarding exemptions vague in 
the legislation authorizing the CBDTP, groups seeking exemptions 
have engaged in behind-the-scenes lobbying efforts to influence the 
TMRB and TBTA’s decision-making processes, as well as overt 
efforts to sway public opinion.127  Should these efforts fail, these 
groups may turn to the court system or seek additional legislation to 
codify exemptions for themselves. 
One group that has been particularly vocal about expressing their 
desire for an exemption is New York City Police Department officers 
and personnel.  Patrick J. Lynch, President of the New York City 
Police Benevolent Association, argues that police officers should 
receive an exemption because they require “the greatest possible 
flexibility” in getting to work.128  According to Lynch, the 
unpredictability of hours and work locations for officers and their 
need to respond rapidly in emergency situations, often to locations 
poorly served by mass transit, makes driving into the CBD 
unavoidable.129  Lynch suggests an exemption for police officers and 
other public employees in critical roles is necessary in addition to the 
 
 126. See generally Fitzsimmons & Hu, supra note 99. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Patrick J. Lynch, Exempt Cops from Congestion Fees: Police Officers Work 
Odd Hours, and They Don’t Choose Where They’re Posted, DAILY NEWS (Apr. 8, 
2019), 
https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-exempt-cops-from-congestion-fees-20
190408-pj2ebsx2njdibiud7etso6wuma-story.html [https://perma.cc/W8A3-8SUJ]. 
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advocacy groups, including Riders Alliance, Transportation Alternatives, and the 
RPA, as well as at least one state legislator. Gersh Kuntzman, Transit Advocates 
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congestion-pricing-carveout/ [https://perma.cc/3HXN-6PAY]. These opponents argue 
that the commuting challenges faced by police personnel are not meaningfully 
different from those faced by thousands of other workers, and that a carve-out would 
undermine the effectiveness of the CBDTP. Id. 
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exemption for emergency vehicles because “those vehicles don’t run 
unless first responders are able to get to work.”130 
Another faction seeking exemption from the proposed CBDTP is 
the taxi and car service industry.131  Taxis and car services are already 
subject to a surcharge ($2.50 for medallion taxicabs, $2.75 for other 
for-hire transportation trips, and $0.75 per pool ride) that operators 
must add to the price of any trip beginning in, ending in, or passing 
through the area of Manhattan south of 96th Street.132  The New 
York Taxi Workers Alliance, a union representing more than 20,000 
taxi, green cab, car service, and rideshare drivers, contends the 
current surcharge is severely harming the livelihoods of its 
members.133  The industry, which has been supported in its quest for 
an exemption by New York City Council members Ydanis Rodriguez 
and Fernando Cabrera, argues that the addition of tolls under the 
CBDTP will cause further harm to struggling, working-class drivers 
already suffering from rideshare competition and the medallion 
lending crisis.134  Industry leaders contend an exemption is necessary 
to protect driver incomes and to enable the continued existence of 
their industry in a densely populated city.135 
Like their counterparts in the taxi and car service industry, private 
bus and trucking companies are seeking exemptions from the CBDTP 
as well.136  Bus operators argue they can serve as part of the solution 
to congestion by transporting passengers who would otherwise be 
 
 130. Lynch, supra note 128. 
 131. Fitzsimmons & Hu, supra note 99. 
 132. See Congestion Surcharge, supra note 125. 
 133. Our Fight to Exempt Yellow and Green Cabs from the Congestion 
Surcharge!, N.Y. TAXI WORKERS ALLIANCE, http://www.nytwa.org/exemptnow 
[https://perma.cc/4WQ5-LUYJ] (last visited Apr. 2, 2020) [hereinafter Our Fight]. 
 134. Julianne Cuba, Experts: Exempting Yellow Taxis from Congestion Pricing 
Won’t Help Cabbies, STREETSBLOG NYC (May 22, 2019), 
https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2019/05/22/experts-exempting-yellow-taxis-from-congestio
n-pricing-wont-help-cabbies/ [https://perma.cc/GR4Q-SSVC]. Transportation experts 
argue that an exemption for yellow taxis, which account for 20% of all miles traveled 
in the CBD, would be devastating for the effectiveness of the CBDTP. Komanoff 
called such an exemption “the mother of all carve outs.” Id. Experts also note that 
the CBDTP is likely to yield a net benefit to the cab industry by reducing congestion 
in the CBD, thereby increasing the number of fares drivers can complete in a given 
time. Uber, perhaps realizing the CBDTP could benefit them in this way, spent $2 
million lobbying for the program. Shannon Bond, Uber Spent $2m to Help Push New 
York Congestion Charge, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2019), 
https://www.ft.com/content/bb89ecd0-558a-11e9-91f9-b6515a54c5b1 
[https://perma.cc/3WK5-FSY6]. 
 135. See Cuba, supra note 134; Our Fight, supra note 133. 
 136. Fitzsimmons & Hu, supra note 99. 
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using cars.137  In March 2019, several bus companies formed 
BUS4NYC, an alliance to advocate in favor of congestion pricing and 
public investment in bus-related infrastructure — along with an 
exemption for buses under the CBDTP.138  The trucking industry is 
likewise lobbying for an exemption and is seeking discussions with the 
TMRB to educate the board on challenges truckers face.139  Both 
industries argue exemptions are necessary to preserve the economic 
viability of their operations without raising prices for consumers.140 
Drivers of motorcycles and low-emission cars are seeking 
exemptions, arguing their vehicles contribute less than conventional 
automobiles to the congestion and pollution issues the CBDTP seeks 
to address.141  There are almost 8000 electric cars registered in New 
York City, and both state and city leaders support increased electric 
car usage.142  New York State Assemblyman Felix Ortiz proposed a 
bill in March 2019 that would have exempted clean fuel and electric 
cars from congestion pricing fees, along with a separate bill exempting 
motorcycles.143  Assemblyman Ortiz said an exemption for 
motorcycles was a “common sense environmental issue” because 
motorcycles cause less congestion than cars.144  The advocacy group 
Riders Against Congestion argues that motorcycles are part of the 
 
 137. Id. 
 138. BUS4NYC: New Coalition Committed to Curbing Congestion Launches in 
New York City, BUS4NYC (Mar. 25, 2019), 
http://bus4nyc.org/2019/03/bus4nyc-new-coalition-committed-to-curbing-congestion-l
aunches-in-new-york-city/ [https://perma.cc/GH2U-D2P9]; see also Glenn Every, 
Congestion Pricing Board Must Be Bus Friendly, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Sept. 6, 2019), 
https://www.gothamgazette.com/opinion/8775-congestion-pricing-board-must-be-bus-
friendly [https://perma.cc/4AP4-94EE]. 
 139. Fitzsimmons & Hu, supra note 99. 
 140. See Jennifer Smith, Truckers Weigh Higher Costs, Open Roads in New York 
Fees, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 1, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/truckers-weigh-higher-costs-open-roads-in-new-york-fee
s-11554151481 [https://perma.cc/UAW3-8N8E]; BUS4NYC, supra note 138. 
 141. Fitzsimmons & Hu, supra note 99; Jeanmarie Evelly, Should Motorcycles and 
Greener Cars Get a Pass on Congestion Pricing?, CITY LIMITS (May 14, 2019), 
https://citylimits.org/2019/05/14/should-motorcycles-and-greener-cars-get-a-pass-on-c
ongestion-pricing/ [https://perma.cc/3KGG-GW9G]. 
 142. Evelly, supra note 141. In 2018, Governor Cuomo launched a $250 million 
initiative to increase the number of electric vehicle charging stations in New York 
State. Id. Mayor de Blasio has stated a goal of having 20% of all cars in New York 
City be electric by 2025. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Jimmy Vielkind, Motorcyclists May Steer Clear of New Congestion-Pricing 
Fee, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 29, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/motorcyclists-may-steer-clear-of-new-congestion-pricing
-fee-11553883939 [https://perma.cc/WA2W-BXWG]. 
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solution to New York’s traffic problems, because these vehicles cause 
fewer emissions and less congestion than cars.145  Riders Against 
Congestion also points out that motorcycles and scooters provide 
efficient transportation options for residents of neighborhoods with 
poor access to public transit.146 
In addition to the professional and industry groups seeking 
exemptions, various communities are likely to seek exemptions based 
on geography.  New York State Assemblyman David I. Weprin, a 
strident opponent of congestion pricing, has called for an exemption 
for all city residents.147  Elected officials representing New York’s 
suburbs and outer boroughs are also seeking exemptions or the 
removal of existing bridge and tunnel tolls to avoid double-charging 
bridge and tunnel commuters travelling into the CBD: Long Island 
State Senator Todd Kaminsky is seeking a credit for commuters 
entering Manhattan via the Robert F. Kennedy Bridge,148 Bronx 
Assemblyman Jeffrey Dinowitz claims to have exchanged his support 
for congestion pricing for a deal to offer Bronx residents free access 
to the Henry Hudson Bridge,149 and U.S. Congressman Max Rose 
and Staten Island Borough President James Oddo have urged 
removal of the congestion fee for Staten Islanders travelling to 
Manhattan via the Verrazzano-Narrows Bridge.150 
Adding to the exemptions sought for New York communities, New 
Jersey officials have also sought an exemption for their 
constituents.151  Approximately 115,000 people drive directly from 
New Jersey into the CBD each weekday — accounting for about 13% 
of all drivers entering the zone.152  New Jersey Governor Phil Murphy 
 
 145. Evelly, supra note 141. 
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 147. Winnie Hu, Over $10 to Drive in Manhattan? What We Know about the 
Congestion Pricing Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2019), 
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 148. Fitzsimmons & Hu, supra note 99. 
 149. Ryan Hutchins & Dana Rubinstein, New York, New Jersey Governors Cut 
Deal on Congestion Pricing, POLITICO (Apr. 24, 2019), 
https://www.politico.com/states/new-jersey/story/2019/04/24/new-york-new-jersey-gov
ernors-cut-deal-on-congestion-pricing-986686 [https://perma.cc/4WDW-Z6FL]. 
Queens politicians claim to have secured a similar deal for the Cross Bay Veterans 
Memorial Bridge. Id. 
 150. Shant Shahrigian, Lawmakers Call for Exemptions from NYC’s Controversial 
Congestion Pricing Plan, N.Y. POST (July 6, 2019), 
https://nypost.com/2019/07/06/lawmakers-call-for-exemptions-from-nycs-controversia
l-congestion-pricing-plan/ [https://perma.cc/SKP5-7Z2F]. 
 151. Fitzsimmons, New York Is Adopting Congestion Pricing, supra note 89. 
 152. Id. 
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initially suggested CBDTP revenues be shared with the Port 
Authority Trans-Hudson (PATH) and New Jersey Transit, two rail 
services that serve New Jersey commuters, but later discussions 
between Governor Murphy and Governor Cuomo centered around 
providing credits towards congestion pricing fees for tolls paid at 
Hudson River crossings between New York and New Jersey.153  
Initial reports of a deal between the two governors to provide these 
credits, effectively implementing an exemption for all New Jersey 
commuters,154 were denied by the MTA.155  MTA Chairman Patrick 
Foye insisted the MTA would make decisions about credits, 
exemptions, and carve-outs only after conducting traffic studies and 
receiving recommendations from the TMRB.156  If negotiations 
between New York and New Jersey fail to yield an agreement, New 
Jersey officials, like others seeking exemptions, may be forced to 
explore litigation or legislation as a means of obtaining relief from 
CBDTP tolls. 
E. Creation of Exemptions through Litigation and Legislation 
In the event any of the above groups fail to secure an exemption 
from the TBTA, these officials and professional organizations may try 
to secure relief from the CBDTP through litigation or legislative 
advocacy.  Litigation by the taxi industry regarding the congestion 
surcharge implemented earlier this year157 provides a preview of the 
claims groups seeking exemptions may bring against the State of New 
York.  In Taxifleet Management LLC v. State of New York,158 a 
group of medallion taxi owners asserted several causes of action in 
New York State Supreme Court in their attempt to halt the 
 
 153. Larry Higgs, N.Y. Will Cut Us a Break on Congestion Pricing, Murphy Says, 
NJ.COM (Apr. 25, 2019), 
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Says ‘Huh?’, GOTHAMIST (Apr. 25, 2019), 
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 157. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 158. No. 161920/18, 2019 WL 2995810 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 9, 2019). 
2020] KEEPING THE STREETS CLEAR 1033 
surcharge.  The complaint alleged the surcharge specifically targeted 
for-hire vehicles despite the state’s lack of a specific finding that these 
vehicles were a cause of congestion.159  The petitioners argued the 
surcharge, in singling out for-hire vehicles without a rational basis, 
violated both the state and federal constitutions.160  While these 
arguments ultimately failed to sway the court,161 they may provide a 
blueprint for groups denied exemptions.  Exemptions provided by the 
TBTA, if not sufficiently justified by cost, efficiency, public safety, or 
other concerns, may leave the agency open to lawsuits brought in 
court arguing the agency has arbitrarily favored certain groups over 
others. 
Interested parties may also seek to secure exemptions from the 
CBDTP through specific acts of legislation.  While the New York 
State Legislature’s deferral of decisions regarding toll rates and 
exemptions under the CBDTP to the TMRB162 may be indicative of 
its hesitancy to wade into the political thicket of exemptions, effective 
lobbying efforts could yield results for groups with sufficient influence 
in Albany.  The opaque and complex nature of most lobbying 
campaigns makes it difficult to quantify the success of previous 
lobbying efforts by groups seeking exemptions, but the scale of 
lobbying expenditures in New York State indicates lobbying is 
pervasive.  Aggregate spending on lobbying in New York hit an 
all-time high of nearly $262 million in 2018, an increase of more than 
 
 159. Id. at *3. 
 160. Id. In total, petitioners asserted five distinct causes of action. Id. The first 
alleged the arbitrary and capricious nature of the surcharge violated both the New 
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etc.” Id. at *6. 
 162. Connor Harris, Congestion Disaffection, CITY J. (Apr. 10, 2019), 
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[https://perma.cc/3C9A-QSCA]. 
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$21 million from 2017.163  The transportation industry had lobbying 
expenditures of $13,688,570.164  Uber, which invested $2 million 
lobbying for congestion pricing in New York City,165 spent more on 
lobbying than any other entity in the state, with total expenditures of 
$5,989,966.166  These expenditures indicate the scale of resources 
industries and advocacy groups will invest to secure favorable 
legislation or deter unfavorable legislation in Albany. 
In addition to lobbying efforts in Albany, parties seeking 
exemptions may also turn to the federal government for relief from 
CBDTP tolls.  In May, two U.S. congressmen from New Jersey, Josh 
Gottheimer and Chris Smith, introduced the Anti-Congestion Tax 
Act — bipartisan federal legislation aimed at combatting congestion 
pricing fees for New Jersey commuters.167  The Act would prohibit 
the award of federal grants for MTA projects until New Jersey 
residents receive an exemption from the CBDTP and would create a 
federal tax credit to offset congestion pricing fees paid by New Jersey 
residents.168  The Anti-Congestion Tax Act mirrors a strategy used by 
Guy V. Molinari, a U.S. congressman representing Staten Island, who 
in 1985 successfully attached a provision to a Federal Department of 
Transportation appropriations bill mandating that New York lose 1% 
of its federal transportation aid if tolls on Brooklyn-bound traffic over 
the Verrazzano-Narrows Bridge were not removed.169  Molinari’s 
gambit prompted the MTA to remove the tolls despite a predicted 
$10 million loss in revenue from the change and predictions from 
traffic experts that it would increase congestion in Brooklyn and 
lower Manhattan.170 
 
 163. N.Y. STATE JOINT COMM’N ON PUB. ETHICS, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2019), 
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 170. Id. After 34 years, a federal spending package signed into law in December 
2019 removed the ban on two-way tolling on the Verrazzano-Narrows Bridge. Local 
members of Congress, led by Staten Island Congressman Max Rose, supported the 
measure. MTA and independent consultants predict the removal of two-way tolling 
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III. CREATING AN EXEMPTION SYSTEM THAT ADVANCES 
TRANSPORTATION EQUITY 
This Part applies the lens of transportation equity to the issue of 
exemptions under the CBDTP.  Section III.A seeks to define 
transportation equity by examining different conceptions of the term.  
Section III.B formulates a two-part test for determining which 
exemptions to the CBDTP are likely to advance transportation 
equity.  Section III.C applies this test to the various groups and 
communities currently seeking exemptions from the CBDTP.  Finally, 
Section III.D suggests alternative strategies for ensuring the CBDTP 
supports, rather than hinders, creation of an equitable transportation 
system in the New York City region. 
A. Defining Transportation Equity 
Authorities can measure the consequences of congestion pricing 
for various subsets of a region’s population through the concept of 
transportation equity.  Measurement of transportation equity involves 
comparisons of transportation benefits, burdens, and resource 
allocations between neighborhoods with high concentrations of 
vulnerable populations and regional averages.171  Advocates of 
transportation equity seek to create fairness in mobility, 
transportation access, and transportation cost across races, classes, 
and geographies.172  Factors in determining transportation equity 
include environmental consequences of transportation policies, 
discrepancies in resource allocation and investment, and distribution 
of service across various population groups.173  Transportation equity 
is difficult to measure because there is no single, agreed-upon 
 
will reduce traffic congestion on Staten Island, generate additional revenue for 
transportation projects, and deter the practice of “toll shopping,” which incentivized 
drivers to enter New York City through Staten Island rather than through more 
direct routes. Erik Bascome, With Legislation Signed, Split Tolling No Longer 
Banned on Verrazzano Bridge, STATEN ISLAND ADVANCE (Dec. 23, 2019), 
https://www.silive.com/news/2019/12/with-legislation-signed-split-tolling-no-longer-ba
nned-on-verrazzano-bridge.html [https://perma.cc/4XS4-XM57]. 
 171. Equity, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP. (Dec. 17, 2013), 
https://www.transportation.gov/mission/health/equity [https://perma.cc/F3MT-47W3]. 
 172. Sean B. Seymore, Set the Captives Free!: Transit Inequity in Urban Centers, 
and the Laws and Policies Which Aggravate the Disparity, 16 GEO. MASON. U. CIV. 
RTS. L.J. 57, 61 (2005). 
 173. Id. 
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definition of the concept.174  Various categorizations of actors, 
analyses of impacts, and methods of measurement can all yield 
differing determinations of what is “equitable.”175 
Researcher Todd Litman of the Victoria Transport Policy Institute 
defines three separate conceptualizations of transportation equity: 
“horizontal equity,”  “vertical equity with regard to income and social 
class,” and “vertical equity with regard to mobility, need, and 
ability.”176  Horizontal equity examines the distribution of 
transportation impacts among individuals and groups with equal 
abilities and needs.177  Horizontal equity suggests that public policies 
should avoid favoring one group or individual over others.178  
Transportation users should “get what they pay for and pay for what 
they get.”179  Vertical equity contemplates the distribution of 
transportation impacts among individuals and groups with differing 
abilities and needs.180  Vertical equity with regard to income and 
social class explicitly encourages progressive transportation policies 
that favor economically and socially disadvantaged groups to 
compensate for broader inequalities.181  Vertical equity with regard to 
mobility, need, and ability focuses on ensuring transportation systems 
are designed to support the needs of users with physical disabilities.182 
Litman is not the only theorist with a tripartite theory on equity 
within transportation policy. Robert Bullard of Texas Southern 
University — considered by some to be the father of environmental 
justice183 — has separately defined three conceptualizations of 
transportation equity: procedural equity, geographic equity, and 
social equity.184  Procedural equity focuses on the process by which 
transportation decisions are made and executed, and considers 
 
 174. TODD LITMAN, VICTORIA TRANSP. POLICY INST., EVALUATING 
TRANSPORTATION EQUITY: GUIDANCE FOR INCORPORATING DISTRIBUTIONAL 
IMPACTS IN TRANSPORTATION PLANNING 2 (2006). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 4. 
 177. Id. 
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 179. Id. 
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 182. Id. 
 183. Dr. Robert Bullard, TEX. SOUTHERN U., 
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visited Apr. 2, 2020). 
 184. Robert D. Bullard, Addressing Urban Transportation Equity in the United 
States, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1183, 1188 (2003). 
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whether rules apply equally to everyone.185  Geographic equity 
focuses on how transportation decisions affect individuals and 
communities in different geographic locations.186  Social equity 
focuses on distribution of transportation benefits and burdens across 
racial, socioeconomic, and generational classes.187  Although they 
differ slightly in their organization, Bullock’s and Litman’s 
conceptualizations of transportation equity share an emphasis on the 
disparate impacts of transportation decisions on different 
communities and classes of people. 
Whether, and to what extent, a congestion pricing plan advances 
transportation equity depends both on how communities and 
institutions measure equity and on the specifics of the plan itself, 
particularly the uses of the revenue raised through tolls.  Traditional 
transportation pricing instruments, such as subway fares or bridge and 
tunnel tolls, advance Litman’s idea of horizontal equity.  Those 
utilizing a piece of transportation infrastructure bear the costs 
associated with building and maintaining that infrastructure.188  
People “get what they pay for and pay for what they get.”189  
Congestion pricing also advances horizontal equity by imposing a cost 
on the externalities inherent to automobile travel through congested 
areas, such as emissions, noise pollution, and the potential for 
accidents.  When, as in New York, the state directs revenues from 
congestion pricing towards public transportation, though, congestion 
pricing additionally functions in a more directly progressive manner, 
advancing Litman’s concept of vertical transportation equity.190  This 
directed use of revenues advances vertical transportation equity 
because the median income of commuters who take public 
transportation is lower than that of commuters who drive to work on 
their own,191 so congestion pricing channels resources away from 
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relatively high-income individuals towards systems utilized by 
relatively low-income individuals.192  If the state were to use 
congestion pricing revenue in a manner that does not benefit the 
public, or if the costs of congestion pricing were imposed 
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(Feb. 25, 2014), 
https://www.governing.com/topics/transportation-infrastructure/gov-public-transporta
tion-riders-demographic-divide-for-cities.html [https://perma.cc/CG6M-6VWT]. In 
2014, commuters driving alone to work reported $4,314 higher earnings than those 
taking public transportation. Id. 
 192. This fact was a point of controversy during the debate over implementing 
congestion pricing in New York, when some elected officials, including Mayor de 
Blasio, erroneously argued that congestion pricing would function as a regressive tax. 
See Gersh Kuntzman, If Congestion Pricing Fails, Remember These Insane 
Comments by Assembly Member Rodneyse Bichotte, STREETSBLOG NYC (Mar. 21, 
2019), https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2019/03/21/if-congestion-pricing-fails-remember- 
these-insane-comments-by-assembly-member-rodneyse-bichotte/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZA6V-K6U2]. 
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disproportionately on lower-income individuals, this would not be the 
case.193 
Whether congestion pricing advances Bullard’s conceptualizations 
of transportation equity also depends on the specifics of the system’s 
implementation.  While the state legislature has already established 
the procedural elements of New York’s CBDTP, those tasked with 
implementing the plan will need to ensure it does not negatively 
impact geographic or social equity.  Doing so will involve designing a 
tolling structure that disincentivizes driving overall rather than simply 
shifting traffic congestion and the associated emissions away from 
Manhattan’s CBD into lower-income areas.  The TBTA must create a 
system of toll credits and exemptions that ensures low-income 
individuals without access to mass transit do not lose access to 
economic opportunities in lower Manhattan.  The MTA must ensure 
CBDTP revenues are targeted towards communities with the greatest 
need for public transit improvements, rather than used to subsidize 
projects disproportionately benefitting high-income 
neighborhoods.194  In determining the details of the CBDTP’s design 
and implementation, the TBTA and MTA must ensure the program 
is executed in a progressive manner and avoid imposing new tolls on 
residents of economically disadvantaged neighborhoods and 
communities without providing corresponding benefits in the form of 
increased investment in public transportation. 
B. Determining Which Exemptions Advance Transportation Equity 
In determining which exemptions to grant under the CBDTP, the 
TMRB and TBTA should take care to maintain the benefits of the 
CBDTP for both horizontal and vertical transportation equity.  To 
maintain horizontal equity, these authorities must ensure exemptions 
prevent a net increase in negative externalities stemming from 
congestion and emissions.195  Exemptions should disincentivize 
travelers from utilizing transportation options, such as air travel or 
longer driving routes, that cause greater emissions or congestion as a 
 
 193. One can tell a similar story regarding the effects of congestion pricing on 
vertical equity with regard to mobility need and ability. The degree to which the costs 
of congestion pricing are directed at individuals with disabilities and the revenues are 
used to benefit individuals with disabilities can vary substantially based upon 
implementation decisions. 
 194. See generally Bullard, supra note 184, at 1188. 
 195. See LITMAN, supra note 174, at 5. Because all people experience the negative 
effects of emissions but not all people benefit from the vehicles causing the emissions, 
emissions have an inherently adverse effect on horizontal transportation equity. 
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result of CBDTP tolls.  To maintain vertical equity, the TMRB and 
TBTA must ensure that exemptions do not act regressively by 
disproportionately benefitting wealthy individuals and pushing the 
burden of funding public transportation onto those with lesser 
means.196  Exemptions should protect the viability of low-cost 
transportation options so that the CBDTP does not raise overall 
transportation costs for low-income individuals.  The dual 
considerations of horizontal and vertical equity yield a two-part test 
for determining which exemptions should be granted: an exemption 
should be granted if, and only if, lack thereof will (1) direct affected 
individuals towards less efficient modes of transportation (i.e. those 
that cause greater emissions or congestion); or (2) function 
regressively by causing low-income communities to bear a 
disproportionately large share of transportation infrastructure costs.  
This test’s application will ensure exemptions serve to advance, rather 
than undermine, the core objectives of the CBDTP. 
Because even limited exemptions will significantly undercut the 
benefits of the CBDTP,197 this test presumes exemptions should be 
limited to instances where they are necessary to preserve the 
program’s objectives of reducing emissions and congestion and of 
raising revenue for public transportation in the New York City 
region.  The dual-pronged test ignores external political and social 
concerns that might otherwise weigh in favor of exemptions for 
particular groups.198  While the relevant authorities may ultimately 
determine that these concerns justify creation of exemptions that do 
not pass the two-part test, these authorities should do so with the 
knowledge that such exemptions come with environmental and 
financial costs.  Applying the test to the groups currently seeking 
exemptions will allow the authorities to make equitable and sound 
policy judgements. 
 
 196. The two exemptions included in the CBDTP’s enacting legislation — the 
exemption for vehicles carrying persons with disabilities and the tax credit for CBD 
residents making less than $60,000 — both reflect these objectives. The disability 
exemption furthers Litman’s concept of vertical equity with regard to mobility need 
and ability, while the tax credit helps to preserve vertical equity with regard to 
income and social class by diverting costs from the CBDTP away from some of the 
CBD’s poorest residents. 
 197. See supra notes 99–108 and accompanying text. 
 198. For example, the Police Benevolent Association argues that an exemption for 
first responders would provide benefits for public safety. See Lynch, supra note 128. 
The taxi industry and its advocates on the city council argue that lack of an 
exemption will have a devastating effect on the livelihoods of taxi drivers. See Cuba, 
supra note 134; Our Fight, supra note 133. 
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C. Who Should Get an Exemption? 
Application of the two-part test shows which exemptions serve to 
advance the transportation equity benefits of the CBDTP, and which 
undermine those benefits.  Exemptions can advance horizontal 
transportation equity, fulfilling the first prong of the test, by lowering 
overall transportation-related emissions and improving travel times.  
Examples include exemptions that deter toll shopping — the practice 
of driving a longer distance to minimize toll costs199 — and 
exemptions that promote land-based commercial mass transit as a 
low-emission alternative to air travel and solo car travel.200  
Exemptions can advance vertical transportation equity, fulfilling the 
second part of the test, by preserving the affordability of inexpensive 
mass transportation options, such as commercial inter-city bus travel, 
for low-income individuals.201 
One broad trend that appears when applying the two-part test is 
that it disfavors exemptions for single-occupancy vehicles.  For almost 
all drivers of single-occupancy vehicles, the primary reasonable, 
lower-cost alternatives for entering the CBD are public 
transportation — in most cases buses, commuter rail, or heavy rail 
systems — cycling, or walking.  All of these options contribute less to 
traffic congestion and carbon dioxide emissions than single-occupancy 
vehicles.202  These options are also cheaper than commuting into the 
 
 199. JONES ET AL., supra note 108, at 6. 
 200. Climate Change: Should You Fly, Drive or Take the Train?, BBC NEWS (Aug. 
24, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-49349566 
[https://perma.cc/2KCX-T6A4]. Bus travel results in 104g of carbon dioxide emissions 
per passenger per kilometer traveled. Rail travel results in 41g per passenger per 
kilometer. Domestic air travel results in 133g per passenger per kilometer plus an 
additional 121g in secondary effects from high-altitude, non-carbon dioxide 
emissions. Car travel results in 171g of carbon dioxide emissions per passenger per 
kilometer, although this number is reduced proportionally if more than one 
passenger is travelling in a car. Id. 
 201. Commercial bus travel generally serves as the least expensive means of 
intercity transportation. See infra note 214 and accompanying text. 
 202. A single-occupancy vehicle emits an average of 0.96 pounds of carbon dioxide 
per passenger mile. TINA HODGES, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., PUBLIC 
TRANSPORTATION’S ROLE IN RESPONDING TO CLIMATE CHANGE 3 (2010), 
https://www.transit.dot.gov/sites/fta.dot.gov/files/docs/PublicTransportationsRoleInR
espondingToClimateChange2010.pdf. [https://perma.cc/A2JU-GYTC]. At average 
occupancy, buses emit 0.64 pounds per passenger mile, commuter rail emits 0.33 
pounds, and heavy rail (such as the New York City subway) emits 0.23 pounds. Id. 
While a four-person carpool reduces a car’s emissions to 0.24 pounds of carbon 
dioxide per passenger mile, full occupancy also lowers the emissions of public 
transport to 0.18 pounds of carbon dioxide per passenger mile for buses, 0.10 pounds 
for commuter rail, and 0.11 pounds for heavy rail. Id. For a full account of how the 
New York City region’s mass transit services fare against national averages in terms 
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CBD via single-occupancy vehicle or relying upon single-occupancy 
vehicles such as taxis or rideshare vehicles to travel within the zone.203  
This means that lack of exemptions for operators of single-occupancy 
vehicles would, in most cases, not direct individuals towards less 
efficient modes of transportation and would not function in a 
regressive manner.  Exemptions for police personnel,204 taxis,205 
rideshares,206 for-hire vehicles,207 motorcycles,208 electric vehicles,209 
 
of carbon dioxide emissions, see id. at 11–16. While walking and cycling do result in 
some carbon dioxide emissions, these emissions pale in comparison to those 
produced by any other method of transportation, assuming the individual at issue 
consumes a normal diet. See Brian Palmer, Two Wheels vs. Four, SLATE (Aug. 9, 
2011), https://slate.com/technology/2011/08/how-soon-does-a-bike-pay-back-its- 
initial-carbon-footprint.html [https://perma.cc/GR3A-NTBK]. 
 203. The American Public Transportation Association estimates that the average 
New York commuter could save $1247 a month and $14,969 annually by owning and 
driving one fewer car and instead commuting via public transportation. Press 
Release, Am. Pub. Transp. Ass’n, June Transit Savings Report: Soaring Gas Prices 
Take Transit Savings to Highest Level of the Year (June 8, 2018), 
https://www.apta.com/news-publications/press-releases/releases/june-transit-savings-r
eport-soaring-gas-prices-take-transit-savings-to-highest-level-of-the-year/ 
[https://perma.cc/798R-K69S]. The fare for a subway or local bus ride in New York 
City is $2.75. The fare for an express bus ride is $6.75. Fares & MetroCard, MTA, 
http://web.mta.info/metrocard/mcgtreng.htm [https://perma.cc/A3U9-LYQ2] (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2019). Accounting for New York’s existing congestion surcharge, the 
minimum taxi fare in Manhattan is $5.80 and the minimum Uber cost is $10.75. See 
supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 204. This exemption would not function in a regressive manner because police 
officers earn more than the median income in most New York City neighborhoods. 
Although the starting salary for NYPD officers is $42,500, compensation reaches 
$85,292 after five and a half years. After accounting for holiday pay, longevity pay, 
uniform allowance, night differential, and overtime, officers can take home over 
$100,000 a year. Salary and Benefits, NYPD, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/careers/police-officers/po-benefits.page 
[https://perma.cc/7AD4-X2AV] (last visited Apr. 2, 2019). In contrast, the average 
median income in the New York-Jersey City-White Plains Metropolitan Division is 
$48,776. AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY, supra note 191. 
 205. See supra notes 202–03 and accompanying text. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. While motorcycles contribute less to congestion than conventional cars, they 
emit more pollution. A California Air Resources Board comparison of 
emissions-compliant vehicles found that the average motorcycle is ten times more 
polluting per mile than a passenger car, light truck, or SUV. Susan Carpenter, 
Motorcycles and Emissions: The Surprising Facts, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2014), 
https://www.latimes.com/news/la-hy-throttle11-2008jun11-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/7L4Q-DWZE]. Lack of an exemption for motorcycles would not 
function in a regressive manner because motorcycle owners have higher than average 
incomes. The 2018 median household income of a motorcycle owner was $62,500. 
Ron Lieback, Motorcycle Statistics in America: Demographics Change for 2018, 
ULTIMATE MOTORCYCLING (Feb. 7, 2019), 
https://ultimatemotorcycling.com/2019/02/07/motorcycle-statistics-in-america-demogr
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and trucking companies210 are all inadvisable according to the 
two-part test.  These exemptions would not advance horizontal equity 
by reducing emissions and congestion, and would not advance vertical 
equity by preserving low-cost transportation options. 
Commercial mass transit receives mixed results under the two-part 
test.  Like single-occupancy vehicles, sightseeing tour buses fare 
poorly.  Because rideshare vehicles and taxis would pay CBDTP 
charges, consumers avoiding tour buses due to cost would likely 
gravitate towards public transportation or walking, both of which 
create less emissions and congestion than buses.211  Since sightseeing 
tours are a non-essential luxury expense and are more expensive than 
the readily available alternative of public transportation,212 CBDTP 
charges on these buses would not function regressively, so an 
exemption is not appropriate. 
Long-distance bus lines present a different story.  The primary 
alternatives to long-distance bus travel are rail travel, air travel, and 
individual car travel.  Rail travel results in fewer emissions than bus 
 
aphics-change-for-2018/ [https://perma.cc/94PH-AQ2X]. The overall median 
household income in 2018 was $61,937. Gloria Guzman, U.S. Median Household 
Income up in 2018 from 2017, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 26, 2019), 
https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2019/09/us-median-household-income-up-in-20
18-from-2017.html [https://perma.cc/Y3JR-FWKE]. 
 209. Electric vehicles provide no congestion benefits and contribute to pollution. 
In New York, the average electric vehicle is responsible for 1883 pounds of carbon 
dioxide-equivalent emissions per year. Emissions from Hybrid and Plug-In Electric 
Vehicles, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY, 
https://afdc.energy.gov/vehicles/electric_emissions.html 
[https://perma.cc/HC68-6VYH] (last visited Apr. 2, 2019). The average electric Ford 
Focus buyer in 2015 had an average household income of $199,000. Chris Woodyard, 
Study: Electric Car Buyers Are Younger but Richer, USA TODAY (May 4, 2015), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2015/05/04/truecar-study-electric-cars-ric
her/26884511/ [https://perma.cc/YZM2-BR4R]. The average household income of 
buyers of the conventional Focus was $77,000. Id. 
 210. Presumably, consumers within the CBD would bear the extra shipping costs 
imposed by the CBDTP. Manhattan’s median household income of $82,459 between 
2014 and 2018 was higher than the citywide figure of $60,762. QuickFacts: Income & 
Poverty, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 2, 2019), 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/newyorkcitynewyork,newyorkcountyma
nhattanboroughnewyork,US/PST045219 [https://perma.cc/26EE-WYST]. The extra 
costs for CBD residents would therefore be unlikely to function in a regressive 
manner. 
 211. See supra note 202. 
 212. A single ride pass on a New York Sightseeing bus costs $19. Downtown Tour 
— Single Ride Pass, N.Y. SIGHTSEEING, 
https://www.newyorksightseeing.com/double-decker-bus-tours/downtown-tour-single
-ride-pass.html [https://perma.cc/7NDQ-665W] (last visited Apr. 2, 2020). The fare 
for a subway or local bus ride in New York City is $2.75. Fares & Metrocard, supra 
note 203. 
1044 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVII 
travel, but air travel and — depending on the number of passengers 
— individual car travel do not.213  Lack of an exemption for 
long-distance bus travel may therefore direct some individuals 
towards less efficient modes of transportation.  Air travel, train travel, 
and individual car travel are also generally more expensive than 
long-distance bus travel.214  Therefore, lack of an exemption for 
long-distance bus travel may function regressively by 
disproportionately impacting lower-income individuals without access 
to rail, air, or car travel.  While long-distance bus lines could reduce 
costs and congestion by simply moving their pick-up points outside of 
the CBD, these buses still constitute one of the few classes of vehicles 
for which an exemption is appropriate under the two-part test. 
When it comes to exemptions for bridge and tunnel commuters, 
including New Jersey residents, application of the two-part test is 
more complicated.  The test disfavors exemptions for commuters in 
single-occupancy vehicles travelling to destinations inside the CBD 
for the same reasons it disfavors exemptions for single-occupancy 
vehicles generally.215  But for commuters travelling through the 
congestion zone, an exemption may be appropriate.  This is because 
without an exemption these commuters may engage in toll shopping 
and take unnecessarily long routes to avoid CBDTP tolls.216  For 
example, a commuter travelling from Secaucus, New Jersey to Long 
Island City, Queens may, instead of taking the direct 8.5 mile route 
through the Lincoln and Queens-Midtown Tunnels, opt to take the 
longer 23.2 mile route over the George Washington Bridge in order 
 
 213. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
 214. For example, a one-way flight from New York City to Washington D.C. on 
October 5, 2020, cost $99 as of April 5, 2020. One-Way Flights from N.Y.C. to 
Washington, D.C. for October 5, 2020, KAYAK, 
https://www.kayak.com/flights/NYC-WAS/2019-12-09?sort=bestflight_a (search start 
point field for “New York, NY” and search destination field for “Washington, D.C.”) 
(Apr. 5, 2020, 1:55 PM). The same trip on Amtrak costs $54. Id. Via Greyhound bus, 
the trip costs $14 on the same date. One-Way Trip from N.Y.C. to Washington, D.C. 
for October 5, 2020, WANDERU, 
https://www.wanderu.com/en-us/depart/New%20York%2C%20NY%2C%20USA/Wa
shington%2C%20DC%2C%20USA/2020-10-05/?aid=kayak&cur=USD&da=-nycblt3
%2C-nycblt11%2C-nycpen%2C-nycwdx1%2C-nycusour7%2C-knggli%7C-dcawdx%2
C-svsgli%2C-svsppl%2C-alxamt%2C-usllpgli&dm=bus&dpid=ChIJW-T2Wt7Gt4kR
Kl2I1CJFUsI&ds=cheapest&opid=ChIJOwg_06VPwokRYv534QaPC8g&tid=Z_89P
SMHda4hQiZh%240GMKg (search start point field for “New York, NY” and search 
destination field for “Washington, D.C.”) (Apr. 5, 2020, 1:55 PM). While the cost of 
travelling by individual car varies depending on the model of the car and fuel prices, 
use of this mode of transportation requires that the individual have access to a car. 
 215. See supra notes 202–03 and accompanying text. 
 216. See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
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to bypass the CBD.217  In this case, and others like it, lack of an 
exemption would fail the first prong of the test and impair the 
CBDTP’s benefits for horizontal equity because it would lead to an 
increase in overall emissions and may also lead to increased traffic 
congestion at bridges and tunnels that do not empty into the CBD.  
To combat the problem of toll shopping, which already contributes to 
existing transportation inequity in the New York region,218 the 
TMRB and TBTA, informed by traffic studies, will need to consider 
various pricing instruments, such as dynamic pricing,219 two-way 
tolling,220 and credits for bridge and tunnel crossings,221 in order to 
optimally reduce congestion while collecting sufficient tolls to meet 
the CBDTP’s revenue target.  While blanket exemptions provide one 
method of addressing the CBDTP’s impact on transportation equity, 
there are various alternatives that, in many cases, may be more 
effective at doing so. 
D. Alternatives to Exemptions 
Application of the two-part test demonstrates that authorities can 
grant few classes of vehicles blanket exemptions under the CBDTP 
without undermining the plan’s core emissions reduction, congestion 
reduction, and revenue generation objectives.  Some of the groups 
seeking exemptions, though, particularly outer-borough and suburban 
New York and New Jersey residents, do raise legitimate questions 
about the effects of the CBDTP on transportation equity in the New 
 
 217. Driving Directions from Secaucus, NJ to Long Island City, Queens, NY, 
GOOGLE MAPS, http://maps.google.com (follow “Directions” hyperlink; then search 
starting point field for “Secaucus, NJ” and search destination field for “Long Island 
City, Queens, NY”). 
 218. See JONES ET AL., supra note 108, at 6–7. 
 219. By varying the price of CBDTP tolls based on time of day, the TBTA can 
incentivize certain drivers to shift their travel to low-traffic periods. Id. at 9. 
 220. Two-way tolling, which charges drivers both to enter and exit the CBD, 
enhances the effectiveness of dynamic pricing by incentivizing drivers to time both 
their arrivals to and departures from the CBD to low-traffic periods. Id. at 8. 
Infrastructure used for two-way tolling could also be used to identify, and give 
exemptions to, drivers who pass through the CBD in a short period of time, helping 
to address the toll shopping problem outlined above. 
 221. By granting credits for certain bridge and tunnel crossings, the TBTA can 
equalize the cost of entering the CBD from all access points, helping to address 
existing toll shopping problems in the region. Id. at 15. However, these credits must 
be limited so as not to jeopardize the CBDTP’s ability to meet its revenue goals. Id. 
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York City region.222  These concerns, however, can be more 
effectively addressed through actions other than blanket exemptions. 
For example, New Jersey officials’ argument that the CBDTP 
unfairly penalizes New Jersey residents223 points to genuine concern 
about the CBDTP’s effects on horizontal transportation equity.  In 
the current framework for the CBDTP,  New Jersey commuters will 
not “get what they pay for and pay for what they get” under the 
CBDTP.224  They will be forced to pay additional tolls or switch to 
public transit but will receive limited benefits from the revenue 
raised.225  However, creating a blanket exemption for New Jersey 
residents would undermine the core goals of the CBDTP by reducing 
the program’s revenue-generating capacity, as well as its associated 
reductions in congestion and emissions. 
The relevant authorities could more effectively address the 
concerns of New Jersey residents by designating a portion of revenue 
generated by the CBDTP for investment in New Jersey public 
transportation systems, such as PATH or NJ Transit rail and bus 
operations.  This solution would result in less revenue for 
transportation projects in New York, but would preserve the 
congestion and emissions benefits of the CBDTP while addressing 
concerns about horizontal equity for New Jersey commuters.226  Such 
an agreement, although politically difficult due to New Jersey 
politicians’ lack of control over the New York State budget process, 
would ensure that New Jersey commuters receive benefits from the 
CBDTP that make up for their costs. 
 
 222. See Fitzsimmons, New York Is Adopting Congestion Pricing, supra note 89; 
Gersh Kuntzman, Congestion Pricing Opponents Reveal They Are Completely out 
of Ideas — And Easily Flustered, Too!, STREETSBLOG NYC (Mar. 24, 2019), 
https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2019/03/24/congestion-pricing-opponents-reveal-they-are-c
ompletely-out-of-ideas-and-easily-flustered-too/ [https://perma.cc/J4TA-MGDJ]. 
Although congestion pricing does not, on the whole, function as a regressive tax on 
outer-borough and suburban commuters, see supra notes 190–93 and accompanying 
text, it does create a new financial burden for low-income individuals for whom solo 
automobile travel into the CBD is unavoidable. 
 223. See Fitzsimmons, New York Is Adopting Congestion Pricing, supra note 89. 
 224. See LITMAN, supra note 174, at 3. 
 225. Because the legislature designated set portions of CBDTP revenue for the 
LIRR and Metro-North, the program will help fund transit improvements benefitting 
commuters throughout Long Island and the lower Hudson Valley, in addition to New 
York City. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. New Jersey commuters, on the 
other hand, will only benefit from CBDTP revenue to the extent they rely on the 
New York City subway after entering the CBD. 
 226. Increased investment in public transit in New Jersey may even increase the 
congestion and emissions benefits of the CBDTP by making it more convenient for 
New Jersey auto commuters to switch to public transportation. 
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In a broader sense, the geographic distribution of revenues from 
the CBDTP will play a key role in determining the degree to which 
the program advances transportation equity.  Focusing funding for 
transportation projects on areas of the New York City region poorly 
served by public transit can help promote horizontal equity by 
ensuring individuals forced to pay CBDTP tolls due to lack of 
accessible public transportation options for entering the CBD 
ultimately benefit from the CBDTP revenue.  Public transit 
investments in economically disadvantaged areas can promote 
vertical equity by ensuring that low-income communities — which 
often are disproportionately affected by transportation-related 
pollution227 — benefit from increased economic opportunity tied to 
improved transportation access.  A plan for distribution of CBDTP 
revenue that specifically targets areas poorly served by mass transit 
and low-income communities would allow for an equitable 
distribution of the costs and benefits of congestion pricing. 
The creation of additional tax credits can also address concerns 
about the burden of CBDTP tolls on low-income individuals.  The 
legislation enacting the CBDTP already includes a tax credit for 
residents of the CBD with annual incomes less than $60,000.228  To 
address concerns that CBDTP tolls may prevent low-income 
individuals residing outside the CBD from accessing economic 
opportunities inside the CBD, the TBTA could expand this tax credit 
to cover all New York State residents with incomes below $60,000 
residing in areas with poor access to public transportation.  This tax 
credit expansion would ensure the CBDTP advances, rather than 
hinders, transportation equity and does not impair low-income 
individuals’ access to the CBD.  The TBTA could also offer tax 
credits to small businesses whose economic viability is threatened due 
to CBDTP-related costs. 
Targeted revenue allocation and tax credits both serve as more 
effective tools for addressing concerns about the adverse effects of 
the CBDTP than blanket exemptions.  These measures would allow 
authorities to distribute the benefits of the CBDTP to the 
communities with the greatest need and to provide relief from 
 
 227. N.Y.C. ENVTL. JUSTICE ALL., NYC CLIMATE JUSTICE AGENDA 12 (2017), 
https://www.issuelab.org/resources/27269/27269.pdf. 
[https://perma.cc/2CAA-JWMQ]; see Donovan Richards, New York City Must End 
Environmental Racism, CITY & ST. N.Y. (Jan. 29, 2016), 
https://www.cityandstateny.com/articles/opinion/new-york-city-must-end-environmen
tal-racism.html [https://perma.cc/Y8SL-DK6T]. 
 228. JONES ET AL., supra note 108, at 4. 
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CBDTP tolls only to those individuals for whom such relief is 
essential. 
CONCLUSION 
New York City’s CBDTP has the potential to vastly improve 
transportation equity in the region.  The CBDTP can improve 
horizontal equity by reducing carbon emissions and traffic congestion, 
minimizing negative externalities from automobile transportation.229  
These reductions will result in cleaner air, more navigable streets, and 
faster travel times,230 improving life for all city residents.  The 
CBDTP can improve vertical equity by creating a vast new stream of 
funding for the MTA.231  New revenue will allow the MTA to 
upgrade the decaying infrastructure of the New York City subway, 
reduce wait times, expand service, and make New York’s 
transportation system more accessible for people with disabilities.232  
By making transportation more affordable and accessible for the 
communities that rely on it most, the MTA’s train and bus systems 
can serve as an engine for economic growth and a bulwark against 
socioeconomic inequality.233 
Excessive provision of exemptions under the CBDTP, however, 
will undermine the program’s ability to achieve these goals.234  
Officials tasked with implementing the program must approach 
exemptions with a critical eye.  Overly broad exemptions will allow 
more vehicles to enter the CBD without paying a toll, hampering the 
CBDTP’s effectiveness at reducing congestion and emissions.235  By 
reducing the number of paying vehicles, excessive exemptions will 
force the TBTA to charge higher tolls to meet its established revenue 
targets,236 impeding access to Manhattan’s CBD — and the economic 
opportunities present within — for individuals without exemptions. 
 
 229. See FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., PRIMER, supra note 39. 
 230. Komanoff, The Fix NYC, supra note 42. 
 231. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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 233. See id.; Gillian B. White, Stranded: How America’s Failing Public 
Transportation Increases Inequality, ATLANTIC (May 16, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/05/stranded-how-americas-failing-
public-transportation-increases-inequality/393419/ [https://perma.cc/N382-VR4R]. 
 234. See supra notes 99–108 and accompanying text. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Fitzsimmons & Hu, supra note 99. 
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To determine which exemptions advance the CBDTP’s 
overarching goals of revenue generation and congestion reduction, 
the TMRB and TBTA should examine each requested exemption 
through the lens of transportation equity.  The work of Litman, 
Bullock, and others, along with the two-part test defined in this Note, 
offers a framework for officials to establish which exemptions 
promote an equitable transportation system in which costs and 
benefits are distributed fairly and progressively, and which 
exemptions serve to benefit the interests of niche groups while 
damaging the quality of New York’s transportation network overall. 
Maintaining a transportation system that is reliable, affordable, and 
accessible will be integral for ensuring New York remains a vibrant 
and livable city over the coming decades,237 and the CBDTP has the 
potential to serve as a key tool in doing so.  Limiting exemptions 
under the CBDTP to instances where these exemptions are necessary 
to preserve congestion and emissions reductions and access to 
transportation for low-income communities — and utilizing other, 
more targeted measures to address remaining concerns about the 
CBDTP’s adverse effects — will ensure the CBDTP is successful in 
bringing about a more equitable transportation landscape in the New 
York City region. 
 
 237. See CAPITAL PROGRAM, supra note 232. 
